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SUGARMAN v. STATE
Proceedings and provides reciprocity with respect to com-
pelling witnesses to go from Maryland to testify in other
states, and vice versa.
A series of statutes makes it possible to compel persons
to testify in certain criminal prosecutions despite that such
testimony might incriminate themselves, vith the "immunity
proviso" that, if they are so compelled, they shall not be
prosecuted for the crimes as to which they testify. Chapter
434 thus deals with bribery, Chapter 435 with lottery cases,
Chapter 438 with gaming cases, and Chapter 439 with con-
spiracy cases.
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY
UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Sugarman v. State'
A police officer arrested the'defendant-appellant upon
his mere suspicion that the defendant was engaged in the
operation of a lottery. While walking to the station house
with the officer, the defendant asked to be released, promis-
ing the officer to "make it all right with you". Upon the
officer's refusal, the defendant broke away, escaped, but
was later recaptured and placed in a cell in the police sta-
tion. The police secured a warrant to search the defend-
ant's automobile, in which they found certain lottery tickets.
The defendant was subsequently indicted and convicted of
the crime of having in his possession lottery tickets and
other paraphernalia used in carrying on a lottery. The
defendant appealed on the ground that the lottery tickets
found in his cell and in his car were inadmissible in evi-
dence. Held, reversed and remanded. The defendant was
illegally arrested in the first instance; and thus his offer to
the police officer to "make it all right" with him was not an
attempt to bribe, for the act of the defendant did not amount
to influencing a public official in the performance of his duty,
as bribery is defined in the Code.' A police officer in making
an illegal arrest is not performing his official duty. There-
fore the second arrest was also illegal, and the lottery tickets
found in his cell were not admissible in evidence under the
Bouse Act." That act forbids in the trial of misdemeanors
the utilization of evidence illegally obtained. As to the
'195 A. 324 (Md. 1937).
'Md. Code, Art. 27, See. 31.
'Md. Code Supp., Art. 35, See. 4-A.
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tickets found in the automobile the Court held that a war-
rant to search an automobile for lottery tickets was not
recognized at common law; and since there is no statute
authorizing such a warrant, it was invalid. As a conse-
quence the tickets discovered in the defendant's car were
also inadmissible under the Bouse Act.
The case presents the questions of what is bribery and
when may a search warrant issue for the purpose of secur-
ing evidence. It also gives an opportunity to review the
cases interpreting the Bouse Act.
A perusal of the authorities assures us that the Court of
Appeals was well supported in holding that in making the
illegal arrest, the officer was not in the performance of his
duties and that consequently he could not be the object of a
bribe. The precise question that confronted the Maryland
Court in the instant case was before the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals which decided," following what is the
overwhelming weight of authority, that an offer to make a
gift of money to an officer who has illegally arrested a sus-
pect was not an attempt to bribe because the officer was not
carrying out his official duty.
In a Missouri case5 an offer to a member of the Board of
Health of St. Louis to influence his vote in awarding a con-
tract for the disposal of the city garbage was held not a bribe
because the City. Council did not have the power to place
such authority in the Board of Health, and thus the Board
was not in the performance of its duty. This case thor-
oughly discusses the problem and, in the course of the
lengthy opinion, considers a great portion of the authority
appertaining thereto.
Where there is an offer to a city councilman to cast
his vote for a certain individual to fill a public office, it has
been held that bribery was not present when the office did
not exist. Upon corruptly procuring a city attorney to
advise the City Council to make a contract, even though the
city did not have authority to contract in that particular
instance, the accused was found guilty of bribery, for it was
the attorney's duty to advise the council.' On several occa-
sions City Councilmen have been convicted of accepting
bribes influencing their votes notwithstanding the fact that
' Moore v. State, 44 Tex. Cr. R. 159, 69 S. W. 521 (1902) ; Ex Parte
Richards, 44 Tex. Cr. R. 561, 72 S. W. 838 (1903).
$State v. Butler, 178 Mo. 272. 77 S. W. 560 (1903).
4 Kitby v. State, 57 N. J. L. 320, 31 Ati. 213 (1894) ; People v. Purley, 2
Cal. 564 (1852); Newman v. State. 97 Ga. 367, 23 S. E. 831 (1895).
'People v. McGarry, 136 Mich. 316, 99 N. W. 147 (1904) ; State v. Lehman,
182 Mo. 424, 81 S. W. 1118 (1904).
SUGARMAN v. STATE
the ordinance in question was illegal.8  One who hzrl given
money to a Federal meat inspector to permit the sale of dis-
eased meat was acquitted on the ground that the act of
Congress under which the inspector derived his authority
was unconstitutional."
The problem that arises in these cases is the question of
determining when an official is performing his duty. It
would seem that a police officer is carrying out his official
duty in making an illegal arrest to the same extent as a
sheriff who releases liquor in his possession which he has no
authority to release ;'O or a coroner, legally acting as a com-
mitting magistrate, who has assumed jurisdiction over a
case which was definitely not within his jurisdiction."
Nevertheless, despite what may be the individual's view as
to the wisdom of permitting one, who has undoubtedly at-
tempted to influence a public official, to escape punishment
or of allowing the official to essay a breach of his public
trust, the authorities are practically unanimous in support
of the contention that an illegal arrest is not within the per-
formance of the duties of a police officer; and that one who
offers the policeman remuneration for allowing him to avoid
such an arrest is not guilty of bribery or of an attempt to
bribe.
With regard to the warrant to search the automobile,
the Court of Appeals held that since no such warrant was
authorized at common law and since there is no statute
permitting its issuance, the search was illegal. In the first
stages of the common law, the search warrant was frowned
upon, but gradually was recognized as a necessary instru-
mentality for the obtention of stolen goods. :However, dur-
ing the reigns of the Stuarts the power of the search warrant
was extended to the search of homes and private effects for
not only stolen goods, but also libelous matter. As the
Eighteenth Century progressed, the status of this warrant
became more confused until in 1765 it was decided in Entick
.v. Carringtot 2 that a search warrant could be issued only
for the purpose of obtaining stolen goods. And, indeed, it
seems that the abuse of the privilege to use this warrant
was the cause of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution
M5urphy v. State, 124 Wis. 635, 102 N. W. 1087, 107 N. W. 470, 111 N. W.
511 (1905) ; State v. Campbell, 73 Kan. 688, 85 Pae. 784 (1906); Glover v.
State, 109 Ind. 391, 10 N. E. 282 (1887).
' United States v. Boyer, 85 Fed. 425 (1898). See also United States v.
Gibson, 47 Fed. 833 (1891).
10 State v. Potts, 78 Iowa 656, 43 N. W. 534 (1889).
1 1 People v. Jackson, 191 N. Y. 293, 84 N. E. 65 (1908).
112 Wils. K. B. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 19 How. St. Trials 1030 (1765).
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of the TJnited States and s'milar provisions in the State
Constitutions against unreasonable searches and seizures. 18
Although there is little case authority on the point, it is
apparent that at common law a search warrant would issue
for stolen goods only, but that statutes may authorize such
warrants for other purposes, so long as the act meets the
requirements of the particular State constitutional provision
against unreasonable searches and seizures.1
Although the Court of Appeals has not expressly confined
the search warrant to stolen goods, it has indicated that only
the common law warrant and those warrants permitted by
statute will issue. Therefore, from the language in the prin-
cipal case 5 one can be safe in assuming that in Maryland
a warrant to search for stolen goods and a warrant author-
ized by statute to obtain property other than stolen goods
are the only search warrants sanctioned by law. However,
it must be remembered that if the procedure under the stat-
ute does not meet with the requirements of Articles 22 and
26 of the Declaration of Rights granting the right to an in-
dividual not to give evidence against himself and forbidding
certain searches and seizures, the act will itself be adjudged,
unconstitutional.
The legislature has seen fit to provide for the issuance of
search warrants in several instances. When the complain-
ant has reason to believe and does believe that the laws in
relation to cruelty to animals are being violated, a magis-
trate may issue a search warrant directing an officer to
search the building in order to discover the evidence of
guilt.1 " A warrant may issue for the purpose of searching
premises and apprehending a deserting seaman.1T In Bal-
tinore City a warrant will issue to search any premises for
gunpowder kept within the city in violation of the city
code.18 A search warrant may also be used to obtain from
premises evidence of guilt in violating the law prohibiting
milk cans to be used for other purposes.19 Evidence of a
1 9 Cornelius on Searches and Seizures, 88; Entick v. Carrington. supra
note 12. Relying on the Entick case, Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 9.
Sec. 625, and Bishop's New Criminal Procedure, fourth edition, Sees. 240,
241, limit the warrant to a search for stolen property. See also Cornelius
on Searches and Seizures, 88; Hochheimer, Criminal Law, 370; State v.
Best, 8 N. J. Misc. 271, 150 Atl. 44 (1930) ; Montana v. Chinook Township,
45 Mont. 375, 123 Pa. 405 (1912) ; Newberry v. Carpenter, 107 Mich. 567,
65 N. W. 530, 61 Am. S. R. 346, 31 L. R. A. 163 (1895).
"I Newberry v. Carpenter, supra note 13; Bishop's New Criminal Pro-
cedure, Fourth Edition, Sees. 240, 241.11 See also Meisinger v. State, 155 Md. 195, 141 Atil. 536 (1928).
20 Md. Code, Art. 27, Sec. 78.
21 Md. Code, Art. 84, Sec. 2.
29 Baltimore City Code, Art. 13, Sees. 78-84; especially Sec. 83.
2 Md. Code, Art. 27, Secs. 369, 371.
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violation of the opium laws can be seized by a search war-
rant."0
Although some States have statutes -'roviding for a gen-
eral warrant to search for evidence, Maryland has evidently
placed a definite limitation on the extent of the warrant and
by the recent decision in the principal case has given to the
individual a greater protection over his personal rights.
Prior to the Bouse Act,2 evidence secured through an
illegal search was admissible in Maryland in a criminal
ease and it is evident that the great weight of authority in
this country and England supported that view. 23 In 1886
the Supreme Court of the United States handed down an
opinion in Boyd v. United States2' in which it was held that
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution were
so related that the Fifth Amendment could be invoked by
an accused to prevent evidence, illegally seized, from being
introduced at the trial. In 1904 the Supreme Court repu-
diated the doctrine in Adams v. New York,2 but soon re-
adopted it in 1914 by its decision in Weeks v. United
States. '6 The new view pronounced by the Supreme Court
came as a great surprise, because it was directly contrary
to well established law. Since 1914 various State Courts
have approved and accepted the principle laid down in the
Weeks case, until at present eighteen States follow the Fed-
eral rule of inadmissibility and twenty-six the rule of ad-
missibility.2Y
Such an overthrow of settled law was bound to cause
great criticism, and Dean Wigmore in his work on Evi-
dence," takes a strong and bitter stand against the modern
view. The reasoning supporting the admissibility of evi-
dence obtained illegally is stated clearly and concisely in
Meisin.qer v. State:"
0* Md. Code, Art. 27, Sec. 422. With respect to game illegally In the
possession of an Individual see Md. Code Supp., Art. 99, See. 10. Md. Code,
Art. 27, Sec. 259, requires police officers "to visit all places where they shall
have reason to suspect gaming tables are kept". Whether this authorizes
the seizure of evidence without a search warrant is a matter of conjecture.
If It does, there Is the question of Its constitutionality in light of Art. 22
and Art. 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
21 Supra note 3.
" Melsinger v. State, supra note 15.
28 See Wigmore. Evidence, (Second Edition) Secs. 2183, 2184; and anno-
tations, 24 A. L. R. 1408, 32 A. L. R. 408, 41 A. L. R. 1145, 52 A. L. R. 477,
and 88 A. L. R. 348,
23 116 U. S. 610, 29 L. Ed. 746, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 524 (1886).
I" 192 U. S. 585, 48 L. Ed. 575, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 372 (1904).
20 232 U. S. 383, 58 L. Ed. 652, 34 Sup. Ct Rep. 341 (1914).
" Supra note 23
"Loc. Cit. supra note 23.
2 Supra note 15.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
"In the trial of a criminal case, the admissibility of
evidence is to be determined by its pertinency to the
issue under consideration, and the Court is not con-
cerned with the collateral question of how such evidence
may have been procured. The question of guilt or
innocence of the accused cannot be affected by its
method of procurement, if the evidence is in itself ger-
mane and pertinent to the issue to be decided."
Courts which take this view contend that the necessity
of convicting one who is guilty of a crime outweighs the
protection of civil liberties, especially when the accused has
a remedy against the one who has invaded his privacy.
Those who adhere to the opposite view.of inadmissibility
support their stand by maintaining that if evidence obtained
illegally is admitted, the individual has no means of protect-
ing himself from the authorities, for his civil action against
the wrongdoer is very often an inadequate remedy.'
The legislature of Maryland has apparently recognized
the worth of each of these arguments and has sought to bal-
ance the interests between the necessity to protect society
from crime and the desirability of guaranteeing the indi-
vidual his personal rights. To effectuate this conception,
the Bouse Act was passed in 1929 and by that statute evi-
dence secured by an illegal search and seizure is made inad-
missible in the trials of misdemeanors. Since the legisla-
ture has not taken a stand with regard to felony trials, the
common law of Maryland is presumed to be in effect; ac-
cordingly, evidence obtained illegally is still admissible in
trials of felonies.
Since 1929 there have been several cases decided under
the Bouse Act. If we read together the cases of Heyward
v. State,1 and Gorman v. State" we find that an accused ar-
rested in a house, access to which was gained without a
search warrant and thus illegally, cannot prevent the ad-
mission of evidence found in the house which was the prop-
erty of another nor can he assert that the arrest was illegal
when he admitted to the officer that he was guilty. But the
owner of the house, who was also indicted for a violation of
the lottery laws, can prevent the admission of tickets found
in the house because the search was illegal and unreason-
able, there not being a search warrant.
80 See: Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, 114; Annotation, 88 A. L. . 348; Wig-
more, loc. cit. supra note 23.
"1 161 Md. 685, 158 At. 897 (1931).
88 161 Md. 700, 158 AUt. 903 (1931).
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In Blager v. State33 where a police officer asked the de-
fendant for the lottery tickets in his pocket and the defend-
ant complied with the request, the Court held that the tickets
would be admitted in evidence because the arrest was legal
in that the offense was committed in the presence of the
officer. Also a search of the accused's person in conjunc-
tion with a legal arrest is not contrary to the Declaration
of Rights."
In Baum v. State"' the Court held that "one cannot com-
plain of an illegal search and seizure of premises and prop-
erty which he neither leases, owns, nor controls, nor law-
fully occupies, nor rightfully possesses, or in which he has
no interest". So witAout deciding whether the particular
search was legal or not, the court admitted the evidence thus
obtained on the ground that the right of protection from il-
legal search and seizure is a guarantee to one against in-
vasion of his privacy in his home and papers.
In the instant case of Sugarman v. State the Court has
gone further and laid down the rule that the guarantee of
privacy extends to an automobile belonging to a citizen.
Some jurisdictions have held that an automobile is not such
a place for search of which there must be a warrant. Others
make the question turn on the point whether the automobile
is in a public or private place.". But whatever the rule of
other States, in Maryland under the principal case an auto-
mobile in a public place is a subject protected by the Decla-
ration of Rights. From that it would seem that to search
an automobile no matter where it may be, a warrant is neces-
sary and, for lack of a general statutory provision, none may
be procured, save in the specific instances set out above,
which do not include lottery cases.
If the legislature has sought to balance the interests be-
tween the two social policies of punishing those who have
committed crime and of protecting the citizen's private
rights by passing the Bouse Act, then the legislature has
evidently felt it to be more desirable to punish one for a
felony in spite of the invasion of a privacy. Due to the
less serious nature of the crime the legislature has been
willing to hazard the guilty one's escape from punishment
for a misdemeanor in order to assure the individual of his
privacy in his home. If that be the aim of the statute, as
" 162 Md. 664, 161 Atl. 1 (1932).
2, See Callahan v. State, 163 Md. 298, 162 Atl. 856 (1932), approving of a
search incident to arrest
"163 Md. 153, 161 Atl. 244 (1932).
86 See Milam v. United States, 296 Fed. 629 (1924) ; People v. Case, 220
Mich. 379, 190 N. W. 2S9 (1922) ; Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 13n 69
L. Ed. 543, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 280 (1925) ; 56 C. J. 1194 et seq.
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it appcars to be, then the legislature has overlooked the fact
that in Maryland we do not differentiate. between a felony
and a misdemeanor on the basis of the gravity of the crime
as measured by anti-social conduct and the relatively
heavier punishment received for felonies. On the contrary
the State has retained the old common law distinction be-
tween felony and misdemeanor. Therefore, some of our
greatest crimes, insofar as anti-social conduct and long-
term sentences in the penitentiary are concerned, are mis-
demeanors. For instance assault with intent to rob or mur-
der is a misdemeanor, punishable by up to ten years in the
penitentiary; assault with intent to rape is also a misde-
meanor, carrying with it death, ltfe imprisonment or up to
twenty years in the penitentiary."
From the above we can see that the legislature has not
entirely accomplished its supposed purpose. As Dean Wig-
more remarks, we can visualize a group of felons conspiring
to destroy the City of Baltimore, but the State could not
introduce in evidence an infernal machine seized by the
police in the house out of which the accused wore operating,
for neither the common law nor a statute authorize a search
warrant. And unless the police officer can ascertain the
commission of a crime within through one of the five senses,
a search without a warrant is illegal88 Since a conspiracy
is a misdemeanor" and since the evidence was obtained
through an illegal search, it would be inadmissible.'
Although one may grant that the line of distinction the
legislature has attempted to draw is the solution to the
problem of admissibility of evidence illegally obtained, and
that it is an improvement over the two conflicting rules as
laid down by the federal courts on the one. hand and the old
common law on the other, it cannot achieve the desired end
so long as the peculiar Maryland distinction between felony
and misdemeanor exists in the form of the common law
principle.
"Md. Code Supp., Art. 27. See. 17; Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 91 AtM
417 (1914).
"Gorman v. State; supra note 32.
Md. Code and Md. Code Supp., Art. 27, Secs. 43, 43A. Archer v. State,
145 Md. 128, 125 Atl. 744 (1923).
,0 Md. Acts, 1933, (Extra Session), Ch. 2, Sees. 5, 34, and Zukowski v.
State, 167 Md. 549, 175 Atl. 595 (1934). One who has license to sell alco-
holic beverages consents to it search without warrant. Quaere: What Is
the result when liquor is being sold or manufactured without a license?
See Melsinger v. State, supra note 15.
